A question of Faith: Heidegger’s destructed concept of faith as the origin of questioning in philosophy by Blok, Vincent
Heidegger always had an ambiguous relationship to the domain of faith and 
religion. From the outset of his career, he already characterized philosophy as 
questioning—for instance, as “a proper stance within questioning itself, in the 
actualization of questionability”—and excluded religion from this questionability 
of philosophy (Heidegger 1994a, 197; 2001, 147–48). However, while his early 
destruction of the concept of religion can be seen as an attempt to conceive it as 
a characteristic of philosophical method (Blok 2011a), in his Introduction to 
Metaphysics, for instance, it becomes clear that faith is radically excluded from 
the questionability of philosophy (Heidegger 1983a, 9).1 The reason for this is 
that faith already has an answer to the questionability of philosophy, and 
therefore, isn’t able to have any relation to this questionability at all: “Faith has no 
place in thought” (Heidegger 1977, 372; 2002, 280).
In this essay, we raise the question whether the concept of faith can be 
radically excluded from Heidegger’s method of questioning, as Heidegger claims 
in his Introduction to Metaphysics. In his phenomenology of questioning, for 
instance, Edmund Husserl characterized questioning precisely as a modality of 
faith (1985, 117–19). In the 1930s, Heidegger himself provided a formal analysis 
of thought as faith or belief; belief is holding- to-be- true (cf. 1986, 131–42; 1991, 
121–32 and 1994b, 368–70; 1999, 257–59). Our hypothesis is that Heidegger’s 
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1 The concept of destruction can be seen as one of the main characteristic of Heidegger’s philosophical 
method (Heidegger 1982; cf. Blok 2009). It does not only concern the destruction of metaphysical 
concepts such as “idea” or “ousia,” but also the destruction of the metaphysical meaning of 
philosophical concepts such as will “logic,” “world” or “God” in order to articulate a nonmetaphysical 
meaning of these concepts (cf. Heidegger 1976). In this respect, we can also speak about a 
destruction of the concept of religion in his early work (cf. Blok 2011a).
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concept of holding- to-be- true is a necessary condition for the “original stance of 
inquiry [Fragehaltung] of philosophy” (1986, 110; 1991, 104–5) because only in 
a philosophical questioning that is characterized by faith as holding- to-be- true, 
the “truth of being” can originally resonate.
After our exploration of Heidegger’s characterization of philosophy as 
questioning in the first part of this essay, we articulate three characteristics of 
Heidegger’s concept of questioning in the second part. It becomes clear that 
Heidegger’s method of philosophical questioning concerns the exploration 
(Entfaltung) of questioning in which the truth of being originally resonates 
(Heidegger 1986, 110; 1991, 104–5). After our exploration of Heidegger’s concept 
of the Entfaltung der Frage in the second part, we inquire into the relation 
between philosophical questioning and Heidegger’s destructed concept of faith 
in the third part.2
1. Philosophy as Questioning
From the outset of his career, Heidegger characterized philosophy as questioning 
(Blok 2011a; Derrida 1989, 9). In his Introduction to Metaphysics, questioning is 
characterized in the following way: “Questioning is the genuine and the right 
and the only way of deeming worthy that which, by its highest rank, holds our 
Dasein in its power. This understanding of being of ours, and being itself 
altogether, is therefore what is most worthy of questioning in all questioning” 
(Heidegger 1983a, 89; 2000b, 87–88). Heidegger distinguishes however between 
two specific types of questioning: the “guiding question” (Leitfrage) of the 
metaphysical tradition and the “grounding question” (Grundfrage) that is 
inaugurated by himself. Let us focus on Heidegger’s characterization of the 
method of questioning in the guiding and grounding question first.
According to Heidegger, metaphysics is the name for the questioning of 
philosophy. Although there are several philosophical questions, these questions 
are guided by one single question, namely, the question of last grounds (archē). 
This ground is unusual, because it is not a cause that we can locate somewhere 
in the world. It concerns the essence of things, that is, their Wesensgrund. The 
2 Parts of this article are already published in Blok (2015). While in that article we focus on the 
Heidegger and Derrida controversy about the nature of questioning in order to rehabilitate 
questioning as an essential characteristic of contemporary philosophy, in this article, we focus on 
Heidegger’s concept of questioning in relation to his destructed concept of faith.
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archē of things is found in their essence, that is, in the what- is of this being. 
All metaphysical questions can be reduced to this question of last grounds. It 
is this question that, according to Aristotle, was raised long ago, is still and 
always will be asked and continues to baffle us. The only endeavor of philosophy 
is therefore to find an answer to the question “what is being?” (Aristotle, 
Metaphysics 7.3.1028b2-8). For this reason, Heidegger calls this question the 
guiding question, the question that guides all our questioning in the metaphysical 
tradition.
The distinction between the guiding question of metaphysics and Heidegger’s 
own method of questioning becomes clear if we consider the following 
remark:3 “The more this question becomes the guiding question, and the longer 
it remains such, the less the question itself becomes an object of inquiry. 
Every treatment of the guiding question is and remains preoccupied with the 
answer, preoccupied with finding the answer” (Heidegger 1986, 212; 1991, 
106–7). According to Heidegger, the primary aim of metaphysical questioning 
is to find an answer to this guiding question what being is and to secure this 
answer. This answer had several configurations in the metaphysical tradition—
being appeared as phusis, as ens creatum, as Wille zur Macht and so on—but 
all these answers appeared within the framework of the guiding question; 
being appears for instance as will to power, and this concept of the will to power 
is an answer to the guiding question what being is. With the answer to the 
guiding question, the questioner adopts a certain stance or position toward the 
whole of being (Heidegger 1986, 212–13; 1991, 107–8). According to Heidegger, 
therefore, the guiding question is characterized by the preoccupation with the 
answer, while the nature of this questioning itself remains undeveloped and 
unexplored.
For Heidegger, philosophy consists in questioning as well. But contrary to the 
metaphysical tradition, Heidegger’s method of questioning does not primarily 
consist in finding an answer to the questionability of philosophy: “Actually 
asking . . . means venturing to exhaust, to question thoroughly, the inexhaustible 
wealth of this question, by unveiling what it demands that we question. Whenever 
3 In this essay, we consider Heidegger’s work not as a new philosophy with a new content compared 
with the metaphysical tradition, but as an effort to develop a new method of philosophical thought 
that is able to reflect on the hegemony of representation (Vorstellung) without itself being subjected 
to representation (cf. Oudemans 1990; Van Dijk 1991; Blok 2005). To the extent that Heidegger’s 
thought has to be understood as a methodical thinking, it is legitimate to consider his grounding 
question as another method of questioning, compared with the guiding question of the metaphysical 
tradition. In this chapter, the Entfaltung der Frage concerns another method of questioning, 
compared with the Beantwortung der Frage (cf. section 2).
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such a venture occurs, there is philosophy” (Heidegger 1983a, 10; 2000b, 8).4 
What demands us to question is the possibility that beings have of being “what 
they are and how they are” but also “of not being” and Heidegger’s questioning 
consists in opening up beings in their question- worthiness (Fragwürdigkeit), that 
is, in their wavering between nonbeing and being (Heidegger 1983a, 32; 2000b, 
31). For Heidegger, therefore, being is not the answer to the question of being as 
in the guiding question, but what is most question- worthy: “Henceforth an 
essential differentiation and clarification can be brought into the question of 
being. Such clarification is never an answer to the question of being but rather 
only a thorough grounding of questioning, awakening and clarifying the power to 
question this question—which always arises out of Dasein’s distress and upward 
swing” (Heidegger 1994b, 75; 1999, 52). If we restrict ourselves to Heidegger’s 
characterization of the method of questioning in the guiding question and the 
grounding question—rather than the content of both questions—we receive an 
indication of the difference between both methods of questioning. The main 
difference between the metaphysical and the Heideggerian method of questioning 
has to be situated in the difference between the focus on finding and securing an 
answer (guiding question) and the openness of every possible answer (grounding 
question), that is, the openness to the “inexhaustible wealth of this question.”5
In his Introduction to Metaphysics, it becomes clear that religious faith is 
radically excluded from this questionability of philosophy, which is at stake in the 
grounding question. Heidegger argues: “One who holds on to such faith as a basis 
can, perhaps, emulate and participate in the asking of our question in a certain 
way, but he cannot authentically question without giving himself up as a believer” 
(Heidegger 1983a, 9; 2000b, 7–8). The reason for this is that faith already has an 
answer to the questionability of philosophy—being as a whole appears as ens 
creatum, which is created by God as ens increatum. Therefore, faith has no relation 
to the questionability of philosophy at all. This is confirmed in an early lecture on 
Phenomenology and Theology from 1927, in which Heidegger conceives faith as 
the natural enemy of philosophy: “This peculiar relationship does not exclude but 
rather includes the fact that faith, as a specific possibility of existence, is in its 
4 This doesn’t mean that Heidegger’s method of questioning rules out the possibility of an answer: 
“An answer is no more than the final step of the very asking; and an answer that bids adieu to the 
inquiry annihilates itself as an answer. It can ground nothing like knowledge. It rests content with 
the sheer opinions it traces and in which it has ensconced itself. A question—especially a question 
that involves being as a whole—can be appropriately answered only if it is adequately posed in the 
first place” (Heidegger 1986, 214; 1991, 192).
5 The overcoming of the guiding question consists therefore in the “Überwindung des bisherigen 
Fragens” (Heidegger 1986, 230).
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innermost core the mortal enemy of the form of existence that is an essential part 
of philosophy and that is factically ever- changing” (1976, 66; 1998, 53).
But why is it the case that “what is asked for in our question, is for faith foolishness” 
(Heidegger 1983a, 9; 2000b, 8). Why is a “Christian philosophy a round square and 
a misunderstanding,” as Heidegger argues in his Introduction to Metaphysics? Is it 
likely that faith is completely excluded from philosophical questioning, which 
constitutes the piety (Frömmigkeit) of thinking (Heidegger 2000a, 36)? If we focus 
our analysis on the nature of questioning in relation to faith, we can conclude that 
Heidegger’s rejection of faith has nothing to do with the content of Christian faith. 
On the contrary, Heidegger rejects Christian faith here because it is preoccupied 
with finding answers. Only because of its preoccupation with finding and securing 
an answer does Christian faith fail to have a relation to the questionability of 
philosophy, just like the guiding question of philosophy. In this respect, we can 
conclude that, according to Heidegger, not only a Christian philosophy but also a 
metaphysical philosophy is a round square and a misunderstanding.
More important, Heidegger doesn’t exclude the concept of faith from his 
method of questioning, but only a metaphysical concept of faith that is preoccupied 
with finding answers. In his Contributions to Philosophy from 1936 to 1938, on the 
one hand, Heidegger calls the ones who question genuine believers (Heidegger 
1994b, 12; cf. also the third section of this essay). On the other hand, he even seems 
to be quite positive about questioning as a proper relation to God: “It remains to be 
considered whether the god possesses more divinity in the question concerning 
him or in the situation where we are sure of him and are able, as it were, to brush 
him aside or fetch him forward, as our needs dictate” (Heidegger 1986, 71; 1991, 
68). If Heidegger excludes faith from his method of questioning, therefore, it is 
only faith that is concerned with finding and securing answers. A destructed 
concept of faith still may be associated with the questionability of philosophy.
Before we can explore this relation between Heidegger’s method of questioning 
and a destructed concept of faith, in the next section, we first turn to a radical 
criticism of Heidegger’s privilege of questioning.
2. Three Characteristics of Heidegger’s Destructed  
Concept of Questioning
In this section, we explore three characteristics of Heidegger’s method of 
questioning. In What is Metaphysics? we find a first characteristic of Heidegger’s 
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method of questioning: “First, every metaphysical question always encompasses 
the whole range of metaphysical problems. Each question is itself always the 
whole. Therefore, second, every metaphysical question can be asked only in 
such a way that the questioner as such is also there within the question, that is, 
is placed in question” (Heidegger 1976, 103; 1998, 82). The question of being 
concerns the “whole” of being. Our inclusion in the question of being 
makes clear that the “whole” of being cannot be understood in a metaphysical 
way, that is, as the principle, archē or ground of beings which is found in the 
essence of these beings (ontology) and in a highest being (theology).6 Contrary 
to this onto- theological framework of traditional metaphysics, in which 
the being of beings is the point of departure, Heidegger’s question of being 
concerns the whole of being or being as such: “According to the usual 
interpretation, the ‘question of being’ means asking about beings as such 
(metaphysics). But if we think along the lines of Being and Time, the ‘question of 
being’ means asking about being as such” (Heidegger 1983a, 21; 2000b, 20–21). It 
is this whole of being that is question- worthy (das Fragwürdige) according to 
Heidegger.
As a consequence of Heidegger’s question concerning the whole of being, the 
questioner is included in this question; that which is asked—the question of 
being—in return affects the one who asks.7 The primacy of questioning therefore 
doesn’t testify to a humanistic tendency, as Derrida suggests (Derrida 1984, 
125–26; Blok 2015), but is motivated by the Sache:
The question of who man is must in its very formulation include in its approach 
man in and with his relations to beings as a whole; it must include in its inquiry 
the question of being as a whole. But we have just now heard that being as a 
whole can only be interpreted by human beings in the first place—and now man 
himself is to be interpreted in terms of being as a whole. Everything here is 
spinning in a circle. Of that there can be no doubt. The question is whether and 
6 “Once we had explained the fact in this way, we characterized it as the unshaken point of departure 
for all the traditional metaphysical questioning about ‘Being.’ It begins with beings and is directed 
toward them. It does not begin with Being in the questionworthiness of ist openness” (Heidegger 
1983a, 91; 2000b, 90).
7 “Yet what accounts for the fact that with this thought it is precisely thinking, and the conditions of 
thinking, that are emphasized so essentially? What else could it be but the thought’s ‘content,’ 
what it gives us to think? Accordingly, the content does not really go into abeyance, as it seemed to; 
rather, it comes to the fore in a singular way. For now the conditions of the thought- process as such 
thrust their way to the forefront. With the thought in question, what is to be thought recoils on the 
thinker because of the way it is to be thought, and so it compels the thinker. Yet it does so solely in 
order to draw the thinker into what is to be thought” (Heidegger 1986, 204; 1991, 183; cf. 1983a, 7; 
1986, 237).
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in what way we can succeed in taking this circle seriously, instead of continually 
closing our eyes in the face of it.
Heidegger 1986, 110; 1991, 104–5
The whole of being cannot be understood in a metaphysical way and calls for a 
radical new method of questioning in which the questioner is included.
Heidegger calls his method an exploration of questioning. Already in Being 
and Time, Heidegger does not claim to answer the question of being, but to 
explore (ausarbeiten) this question.8 The objective of this exploration 
(Ausarbeitung) of the question of being is to prepare (ausarbeiten) for a question, 
that is, the grounding question with regard to the sense (Sinn), or in his later 
work, the truth of being.9 What is the nature of this exploration of questioning? 
Heidegger’s answer is: “to explore the question as it is formulated, is to pose the 
question more essentially: in asking the question one enters explicitly into those 
relationships [Bezüge] that become visible when one assimilates virtually 
everything that comes to pass in the enactment of asking [Vollzug] the question” 
(Heidegger 1986, 214; 1991, 192 [my emphasis]).10 In the enactment (Vollzug) of 
the exploration of the question of being, we experience the relation between 
being and thinking, that is, the sense or truth as the un- concealment of being.11
Which relation is opened by the exploration of the guiding question? The 
exploration of the guiding question first of all draws our attention to the direction 
of questioning and demands that we follow this direction, as is said in Being and 
Time. Every questioning is a seeking and every seeking takes its direction 
beforehand from what is sought (Heidegger 1993, 5). When we explore 
8 “Being and Time can be evaluated only by the extent to which it is equal or unequal to the question 
it raises. There is no standard other than the question itself; only the question, not the book, is 
essential. Furthermore, the book merely leads us to the threshold of the question, not yet into the 
question itself ” (Heidegger 1985, 23; 1991, 20–21).
9 “Rather, the determining ground of the development of the guiding question is to be sought in a 
renewed posing of the question, indeed, in a more original asking of that question” (Heidegger 
1986, 214; 1991, 192). Also, the title of the “introductory remarks” of the aim of Being and Time—
“The exposition of the question of the sense of being”—cannot be understood as an introduction to 
this book. Its aim is to explore questioning itself in view of the exposition (“exponere”) of the 
question about the sense of being: “Quite apart from the fact that if we were to follow up the 
problem of the ontological structure of world- historical historizing, we would necessarily be 
transgressing the limits of our theme, we can refrain from this all the more because the very aim of 
this exposition is to lead us face to face with the ontological enigma of the movement of historizing 
in general” (Heidegger 1993, 389; 2008, 441).
10 See also the following remarks: “Henceforth as essential differentiation and clarification can be 
brought into the question of being. Such clarification is never an answer to the question of being but 
rather only a thorough grounding of questioning, awakening and clarifying the power to question 
this question—which always arises out of Dasein’ distress and upward swing” (Heidegger 1994b, 75; 
1999, 52).
11 For Heidegger’s concept of the truth of being, see Blok 2011b.
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(auseinanderfalten) what is at stake in the guiding question—what is being—it 
becomes clear that it is about being (Gefragte). This is not just any being, but the 
being of beings. But because all questioning is somehow a questioning of 
something—a being—this Gefragte is, second, dependent on that which is 
interrogated (Befragte). We call that which is interrogated the field of the 
question. This field is not a neutral domain of questioning of which we can take 
notice in an arbitrary way. Asking the guiding question has a specific aim because 
beings are asked about insofar as they are. That which is asked for (Gefragte) is in 
other words the essence of that which is interrogated (Befragte).12 With this, 
questioning aims at the “being” of these beings. The “being” of these beings is 
that which is asked about (Gefragtes) of that which is interrogated (Befragte). 
The fact that beings are interrogated in their relation to being means, third, that 
beings themselves are already accessible and sufficiently determined; they are 
not question- worthy (fragwürdig).
In order to become that which is asked about (Gefragte), that which is 
interrogated (Befragte) is questioned in certain respects. These respects are 
determined by the aim or goal of our questioning; in this case, the definition of 
the being of beings as an answer to the guiding question “what” being is. 
Heidegger indicates that this being has been understood in a very specific way 
since the beginning of the metaphysical tradition.
Greek science (epistēmē) asks about phusis. Based on an example from 
Aristotle, Heidegger shows that for the Greeks phusis does not have the narrow 
meaning of a natural being. Furthermore, the epistēmē phusikē does not yet 
designate a scientific discipline directed toward the facts within a specific area of 
research only. The Aristotelian epistēmē phusikē is reflection primarily on the 
question of what life, time, space and so on are as that in which the variable, and 
therefore, the moved (phusis) is what it is, namely, the whole of being: “This 
ἐπιστήμη φυσική has as its object everything that in this sense belongs to φύσις 
and that the Greeks designate as τὰ φυσικά. The questioning proper to these 
sciences dealing with φύσις is the supreme question of the Prime Mover, of what 
this whole of φύσις is in itself as this whole” (Heidegger 1983b, 49; 1995b, 32–33). 
12 In Being and Time, Heidegger does not only speak about the Gefragte, but also about the Erfragte. 
This Erfragte concerns the specific scientific- theoretical way the Gefragte is articulated: “In 
investigative questions—that is, in questions which are specifically theoretical—what is asked about 
is determined and conceptualized. Furthermore, in what is asked about there lies also that which is 
to be found out by the asking [das Erfragte]; this is what is really intended: with this the inquiry 
reaches its goal” (Heidegger 1993, 5; 2008, 24). In his later work, Heidegger seems to take these two 
moments of questioning—das Gefragte and das Erfragte—together (cf. Blok 2011a).
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Aristotle asks about the whole of being through the question about the prime 
mover. This question about the prime mover, which is understood by Aristotle as 
the Divine without any specific religious doctrine, belongs to the epistēmē 
phusikē.
Phusis however not only designates nature in this sense. Phusis also concerns 
the nature of things, that is, nature in the sense of the essence of beings. The 
metaphysical question concerning being as such (ousia) is called the ontological 
question. In Aristotle’s work, the different questions concerning phusis as the 
whole of being (theology) and as being as such (ontology) belong together in the 
first philosophy (protē philosophia). The beginning of Greek science is therefore 
the beginning of onto- theology.
What Heidegger tries to show with his exploration of the guiding question is 
that questioning is not neutral, but has a certain onto- theological arrangement 
(Fügung). This arrangement originates from the mode of questioning itself. 
What is asked about is the beingness (Seiendheit) of beings, which is understood 
as the whole of being (theology) and as being as such (ontology). In this specific 
arrangement of questioning, the interrogating relation between questioning and 
that which is asked about in questioning remains forgotten, according to 
Heidegger.13
Our exploration of Heidegger’s concept of the Entfaltung der Frage makes 
clear that the exploration of questioning is something completely different than 
traditional questioning. It is not preoccupied with finding answers to the guiding 
question, but explores the self- evident relation between questioning and the 
interrogated. The exploration of questioning is indeed circular, but not a circulus 
vitiosus. Why? Characteristic of the exploration of questioning is that this 
questioning withdraws from beings without letting them go completely. The 
exploration of questioning “challenges beings as a whole, so to speak, outstrips 
them, though never completely. But this is precisely how the questioning gains 
its distinction. What is asked in this question rebounds on the questioning itself, 
for the questioning challenges beings as a whole but does not after all wrest itself 
13 “During the course of a facticallly experienced day, I deal with quite different things; but in the 
factical course of life, I do not become aware of the different hows of my reactions to those different 
things. Instead, I encounter them at most in the content I experience itself: factical life experience 
manifests an indifference with regard to the manner of experiencing. It does not even occur to 
factical life experience that something might not become accessible to it” (Heidegger 1995a, 12). 
The reason for this is the tendency of life to be absorbed by the world it is engaged in: “Living is 
caring and indeed is so in the inclination toward making things easy for oneself, in the inclination 
toward flight. Thereby arise a directionality toward possible mistakes as such, mistakability, decline, 
making things easy, fooling oneself, fanaticism, and exuberance” (Heidegger 1994a, 109; 2001, 81).
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free from them” (Heidegger 1983a, 6; 2000b, 6). The exploration of the question 
doesn’t ask about beings, but withdraws from these beings in order to have an 
indirect view of the relation between being and thinking, that is, the whole of 
being. In this respect, the circularity of Heidegger’s exploration of questioning 
doesn’t involve a “circular argument,” but the “laying bare the ground” for any 
question and answer (Heidegger 1994a, 8; 2001, 7–8; cf. Heidegger 1993, 153). 
The exploration of questioning concerns the whole of being, that is, the relation 
between being and thinking which encircles every question and answer.
The exploration of questioning cannot be compared with the guiding question 
according to Heidegger: “Certainly, giving up the ordinary and going back into 
questioning interpretation [Auslegung] is a leap” (Heidegger 1983a, 185; 2000b, 
188). Only a completely different mode of questioning has access to the whole of 
being. In Being and Time, Heidegger therefore argues:
The being of beings “is” not itself a being. If we are to understand the problem of 
being, our first philosophical step consists in not μῦϑόν τινα διηγεῖσϑαι, in not 
“telling a story”—that is to say, in not defining beings as beings by tracing  
them back in their origin to some other being, as if being had the character of 
some possible being. Hence being, as that which is asked about, must be exhibited 
in a way of its own, essentially different from the way in which beings are 
discovered.
Heidegger 1994a, 6; 2001, 6
Heidegger’s other method of questioning consists precisely in the exploration of 
questioning with respect to the whole of being. The exploration of questioning 
withholds the answer and commits itself to the relation (Bezug), which is opened 
up by the enactment (Vollzug) of questioning.
In order to see what this method comprises, we focus for a moment on a 
specific thesis in Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, in which he argues 
that a human being doesn’t receive any particular emphasis:
For what is this being, after all! Let us consider [Vorstellen] the Earth within the 
dark immensity of space in the universe. We can compare it to a tiny grain of 
sand; more than a kilometer of emptiness extends between it and the next grain 
of its size; on the surface of this tiny grain of sand lives a stupefied swarm of 
supposedly clever animals, crawling all over each other, who for a brief moment 
have invented knowledge. . . . Within beings as a whole there is no justification to 
be found for emphasizing precisely this being that is called the human being and 
among which we ourselves happen to belong.
Heidegger 1983a, 6; 2000b, 4
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Heidegger’s aim here is not to utter an informative proposition about a being 
that is called human, but in an indirect way, he tries to show how human being is 
already understood, which relation between being and thinking is already 
presupposed in our proposition about beings.14 This self- evident relation shows 
itself in an indirect way in our propositions about beings, so also in Heidegger’s 
proposition we cited a moment ago. “Stellen wir uns vor” means that the self- 
evident relation between being and thinking is one of presentation and 
re- presentation, in which also human being is represented. “No justification 
[Rechtsgrund] can be found” means that the representing relation is self- evidently 
determined by the truth as recht and richtig, by the rectitudo between 
representation (thinking) and the represented (being). Philosophical thought 
only has access to this relation by its withdrawing from beings without its losing 
contact with these beings. Only because of the fact that we are included in 
representation (thinking) does the exploration of questioning have access to the 
representing relation between being and thinking that marks the whole of being.
With this, we encounter the philosophical meaning of the circularity of 
questioning the grounding question. Because questioning the grounding 
question withdraws from beings without losing contact, the risk is always that 
our questioning of the grounding question is still bound up to the representation 
of an archē or principle as an answer to the question of being:15 “Our questioning 
is not yet the leap; for that, it must first be transformed; it still stands, unknowing, 
in the face of beings” (Heidegger 1983a, 8; 2000b, 6–7). The actual enactment of 
the grounding question presupposes a Rückstoß of that which is asked for in our 
questioning; being itself comes up and that we are touched by the hidden power 
of the question of being (cf. Heidegger 1983a, 15). And yet, our questioning 
cannot be understood in a passive way: “Thus the leading into the asking of the 
grounding question is not a passage over to something that lies or stands around 
somewhere; instead, this leading- to must first awaken and create the questioning. 
Leading is a questioning going- ahead, a questioning- ahead” (Heidegger 1983a, 
14 “Philosophy is essentially untimely because it is one of those few things whose fate it remains never 
to be able to find a direct resonance in their own time, and never to be permitted to find such a 
resonance. . . . Philosophy, then, is not a kind of knowledge which one could acquire directly, like 
vocational and technical expertise, and which, like economic and professional knowledge in 
general, one could apply directly and evaluate according to ist usefulness in each case” (Heidegger 
1983a, 10; 2000b, 9 [my emphasis]).
15 “Why the why? What ist he the guestioning of the grounding question, VB] itself, a question that 
presumes to establish the ground of beings as a whole? Is this Why, too, just asking about the 
ground as a foreground, so that it is still always a being that is sought as what does the grounding?” 
(Heidegger 1983a, 6–7; 2000b, 5).
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22; 2000b, 21). Our questioning is only confronted with being when it creates the 
grounding question, “compelling oneself into the state of this questioning” 
(Heidegger 1983a, 3; 2000b, 1). With regard to our questioning of this question, 
Heidegger remarks: “The scope of our question is so broad that we can never 
exceed it” (Heidegger 1983a, 4; 2000b, 2). The grounding question concerns the 
whole of being in which thought is included and the scope of this whole is so 
broad that our questioning will never exceed it. Questioning the grounding 
question then means “venturing to exhaust, to question thoroughly, the 
inexhaustible wealth of this question, by unveiling what it demands that we 
question. Whenever such a venture occurs, there is philosophy” (Heidegger 
1983a, 10; 2000b, 8). Our questioning of the grounding question always remains 
finite compared with the whole of being. With this, it is said that human thinking 
may compel oneself into the state of this questioning, but that the grounding 
question is in the end not achieved by thinking (Heidegger 1994b, 84–87; cf. 
90–95). Our questioning of the grounding question is our being opened to this 
question by a demand of being, if it takes place (cf. Heidegger 1983a, 151). A 
philosophical thinking that really wants to be open to being touched by the 
hidden power of the grounding question must be able to wait for the awakening 
of this question as well. In this sense, Heidegger argues that that which is asked 
for in the grounding question in return affects the one who asks. Only thanks to 
this circularity of questioning does our questioning of the grounding question 
enable us to ask for the whole of being.
When the grounding question is really enacted, then it is a “distinctive 
occurrence,” a “happening” which comes over us, which visits our thought 
(Heidegger 1983a, 7; 2000b, 6). Until that happens, our questioning is bound up 
with the representation of a being (principle, archē) as the answer to our question. 
With this, it becomes clear why human thinking may compel itself into the state 
of this questioning, but that this questioning is in the end opened by a call of 
being, or not: “being able to question means being able to wait, even for a lifetime” 
(Heidegger 1983a, 215; 2000b, 221).16
16 See also the following remarks: “The thinking attempted in Being and Time (1927) sets out on the 
way to prepare an overcoming of metaphysics, so understood. That, however, which sets such 
thinking on its way can only be that which is to be thought” (Heidegger 1976, 368; 1998, 279). With 
regard to the coming generation of philosophers, Heidegger therefore argues: “The question of 
being is the leap into be- ing which man as seeker of be- ing enacts, insofar as he is one who creates 
in thinking. . . . But we of today have only this one duty: to prepare for that thinker by means of a 
grounding that reaches far ahead, of a secure preparedness for what is most question- worthy” 
(Heidegger 1994b, 11; 1999, 9).
32143.indb   134 28/04/2016   10:11
A Question of Faith 135
When this Rückstoß actually takes place, then it disrupts our way of 
questioning, it disrupts ourselves as the ones who question. It results in a “leap 
away from all the previous safety of their Dasein, be it genuine or presumed” 
(Heidegger 1983a, 8; 2000b, 6), the farewell of the guiding question and the 
establishment of the grounding question with regard to the relation between 
being and thinking. Questioning the grounding question only is in this leap, 
which is not an act of human thought, but “attains its own ground by leaping, 
performs it in leaping [er- springt, springend erwirkt]. According to the genuine 
meaning of the word, we call such a leap that attains itself as ground by leaping 
an originary leap [Ur- sprung]: an attaining- the-ground- by-leaping” (Heidegger 
1983a, 8; 2000b, 7). Contrary to the guiding question of the metaphysical 
tradition, Heidegger’s grounding question is characterized by the questioning 
confrontation (fragende Auseinandersetzung) with the whole of being, and this 
questioning confrontation consists precisely in the exploration of questioning 
that we discussed in this section.17
3. Faith and the Questionability of Philosophy
In the previous section, we articulated three essential characteristics of 
Heidegger’s method of questioning: (1) Dasein is included in the question of 
being, in which primarily (2) the relation (Bezug) between being and thinking or 
the whole of being is explored. (3) In our enactment (Vollzug) of the exploration 
of the question of being, the sense or truth of being in return affects the one who 
asks. This means that the question of being only is in the case of a call of being 
and at the same time, that this call of being only is in our exploration of the 
question of being. With this, we are sufficiently prepared to raise the final 
question, whether the concept of faith can be radically excluded from Heidegger’s 
method of questioning, as he claims in his Introduction to Metaphysics, or not.
In his Contributions, Heidegger argues that the abandonment of the guiding 
question of metaphysics and the shift toward the grounding question presupposes 
that the truth of being becomes distress. According to Heidegger, the only one 
who can succeed in this is the one who questions: “It is only through the ones 
who question that the truth of be- ing becomes a distress. They are the genuine 
believers, because, in opening themselves up to what is essential to truth, they 
17 For Heidegger’s method of confrontation, see Blok 2009.
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maintain their bearing to the ground” (Heidegger 1994b, 12; 1999, 10). So contrary 
to his Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger argues here that the ones who 
question are the genuine believers. Why? “[B]ecause, in opening themselves up to 
what is essential to truth, they maintain their bearing to the ground” (Heidegger 
1994b, 12; 1999, 10). Heidegger continues: “Those who question . . . establish the 
new and highest rank of inabiding in the midpoint of be- ing, in the essential 
swaying of be- ing (enowning) as the midpoint” (Heidegger 1994b, 12–13; 1999, 
10). It is important to notice that Heidegger, in his characterization of this specific 
type of questioning of the grounding question, precisely refers to the concept of 
faith or belief. Why is Heidegger referring here to the concept of belief, contrary to 
our findings in the previous section?
We follow Heidegger’s Contributions for a moment in order to understand 
what is meant by this concept of belief and why the one who questions is 
positively seen as the true believer here. Belief or faith is not understood here in 
a confessional way, that is, “faith . . . is not the particular form of belonging to a 
‘confession’ ” (Heidegger 1994b, 368; 1999, 357). He introduces a “destructed” 
concept of faith here, namely, “the essence of faith, grasped from within what is 
essential to truth” (Heidegger 1994b, 368; 1999, 357). This essence of faith is 
found in holding- for-true (Heidegger 1994b, 368; cf. Heidegger 1986, 132–42). 
In this destructed concept of faith, it is not the appropriation (Aneignung, 
Zustimmung) of what is “true” that is stressed.
Faith or believing is normally understood in opposition to knowing. In 
opposition to knowing, “faith . . . means holding- to-be- true that which withdraws 
from knowing in the sense of explaining intuition [erklärende Einsichtnahme]” 
(Heidegger 1994b, 368; 1999, 258). Because faith is understood here from its 
opposition to knowing, Heidegger first asks what knowing actually means: “It is 
the knowing that knows what is essential to truth and accordingly determines it 
primarily in the turning [Kehre] from within this essence” (Heidegger 1994b, 
368; 1991, 258 (modified). In Heidegger’s characterization of knowing, we 
recognize our characterization of questioning in section  2: Philosophical 
questioning concerns the exploration of questioning, in which the truth of being 
originally resonates. Knowing “is originarily holding oneself within the essential 
sway of truth” (Heidegger 1994b, 369; 1999, 258).
On the one hand, it is clear for Heidegger that his concept of knowing is more 
originary than any faith, “which always refers to something that is true” (Heidegger 
1994, 369; 1999, 258 [my emphasis]). But since his own destructed concept of 
faith as holding- to-be- true grasps from within what is the essence of truth, 
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Heidegger can on the other hand conceptualize the essence of knowing in terms 
of his destructed concept of faith:
Thus, if one takes “knowing” in the heretofore sense of representation and 
possession of representation [Vorstellung und Vorstellungsbesitzes], then of course 
essential knowing is not a “knowing” but a “faith.” However, this word then has an 
entirely different meaning, no longer that of holding- to-be- true, whereby truth is 
already known—even if confusedly—but rather that of holding- oneself- in- truth. 
And this holding oneself, having the character of a projecting- open, is always a 
questioning, nay the originary questioning as such by which man exposes himself 
to truth and puts what is essential up for decision.
Heidegger 1994b, 369; 1999, 258
The essence of knowing is understood here as faith, namely, as holding- oneself- 
in- the-essence- of-truth, and this destructed concept of faith has the character of 
questioning.
A critical reader could argue that according to this quote, essential knowing 
is understood as faith only if we oppose knowing as representation and essential 
knowing (holding oneself within the essence of truth). This doesn’t mean that 
essential knowing as such can be understood in terms of faith; faith is holding- 
for-true, and therefore, refers always to something—a being—which is true.18 
And yet, Heidegger argues that “holding- for-true changes according to what is 
true (and finally foremost according to truth and what is its ownmost)” 
(Heidegger 1994b, 368; 1999, 257). In this respect, the essence of faith is grasped 
from within what is essential to truth according to Heidegger. The connection 
between the essence of faith and the essence of knowing is found in the fact that 
in faith, not only a relation to what is believed in is at stake, but also to the one 
who believes him- or herself; holding oneself. According to Heidegger, knowing 
as “holding oneself within the essential sway of truth” can be understood as faith 
as “holding- oneself-in- truth,” and this destructed concept of faith is characterized 
by questioning (Heidegger 1994b, 368–69; 1999, 257–58). Such a positive 
interpretation of the essence of knowing as faith and questioning is legitimate, 
since Heidegger already in the beginning of his Contribution stated that “the 
ones who question” are “the genuine believers” (Heidegger 1994b, 12; 1999, 10). 
This positive relation between Heidegger’s destructed concepts of faith or belief 
as holding- oneself-in- truth and questioning is also confirmed toward the end of 
18 I am very grateful for the critical discussions with my colleague Antonio Cimino regarding my 
interpretation of this passage in Heidegger’s Contributions.
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the Contributions, where he defines the “originary believer” once again in a 
comparable way:
Those who question in this manner are the originary and actual believers, i.e., 
those who take truth itself—and not only what is true—seriously and from the 
ground up, who put to decision whether what is essential to truth holds sway 
and whether this essential swaying itself carries and guides us, the knowing ones, 
the believing ones, the acting ones, the creating ones—in short, the historical 
ones.
Heidegger 1994b, 369; 1999, 258
More important for our objective in this chapter is the question why, according 
to Heidegger, is it the case that questioning is always a holding- oneself-in- the- 
truth? In order to answer this question, we consult another passage in which 
Heidegger conceptualizes faith or belief as holding- to-be- true, from a lecture 
course on Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence of the Same from 1937.19
In this lecture course, the “formal essence” of faith is characterized as holding- 
to-be- true as well:
From these words we derive one thing alone, but the most important thing: to 
believe means to take what is represented as true, and thus it also means to hold 
fast to the true and hold firm in the true. In belief there lies not only a relation to 
what is believed but above all to the believer himself. Taking to be true is holding 
firm in the true, hence holding in a dual sense: having a hold on something and 
preserving the stance one has. Such holding receives its determination from 
whatever it is that is posited as the true.
Heidegger 1986, 134; 1991, 124
In the case of Nietzsche, it is clear that truth refers to something—a being—that 
is true according to Heidegger (cf. Heidegger 1986, 139), and therefore, that 
Nietzsche’s concept of faith is embedded in the metaphysical representation of 
the beingness of beings. Although Heidegger primarily interprets Nietzsche’s 
concept of faith in this passage, we can read this passage also against the grain as 
a formal indication of his own destructed concept of faith we developed before.20
Like in the Contributions, the “formal essence” of faith is characterized as 
holding- to-be- true in his lecture course from 1937. According to Heidegger, this 
19 See Derrida (2002, 97) for his discussion of this passage. Derrida wasn’t able to read this passage in 
light of Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy.
20 For Heidegger’s concept of the formal indication, see Oudemans 1990, Van Dijk 1991, Blok 2005. 
For the ambiguous relation between interpretation and confrontation in Heidegger’s lecture 
courses on Nietzsche, see Blok 2009.
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essence of faith depends on our concept of truth. In the case of Heidegger, what 
is posited as the truth is the truth of being. In a formal way and contrary to 
Nietzsche’s concept of faith, therefore, we can characterize Heidegger’s holding 
firm in the truth as a holding- oneself-within- the- truth of being (cf. Heidegger 
1994b, 368–70). This concept of truth has also consequences for the nature of 
this holding oneself. Faith as holding- oneself-in- the-truth of being is formally 
characterized by (1) holding firm in the truth of being and (2) a holding oneself 
in the questioning stance in this questioning of the truth of being.
Here, it becomes clear why, according to Heidegger, questioning is always a 
holding-oneself-in- the-truth. Questioning is always such a holding- oneself-in- 
the-truth- of-being, because questioning the grounding question presupposes a 
holding firm in the truth of being and a holding oneself in the questioning stance 
in this questioning of the truth of being: “this holding oneself, having the 
character of a projecting- opening, is always a questioning” (Heidegger 1994b, 
369; 1999, 258).
Our foregoing analysis of the exploration of questioning can help us to 
understand the necessity of faith or belief for questioning the truth of being. In 
order to enact the exploration of the question of being, what is asked (the truth 
of being) should in return affect the one who asks the question. On the one hand, 
the exploration of questioning as projecting- opening holds onto the truth of 
being; the exploration of questioning presupposes our disclosedness for the call 
of being by the call of being, if it takes place. This last condition is important, as 
we have seen, because the truth of being doesn’t automatically have a hold on us 
in the age of the abandonment of being (Seinsverlassenheit). There is no call of 
being, nothing to hold oneself in. For this reason, Heidegger argues: “This 
originary believing, of course, has nothing in common with accepting that which 
offers immediate support and renders courage superfluous. Rather, this believing 
is persevering in the utmost deciding. This alone can once again bring our 
history to a grounded ground” (Heidegger 1994b, 369–70; 1999, 258–59). In this 
respect, it is clear that Heidegger’s destructed concept of faith or belief cannot be 
understood, as Derrida suggests (Derrida 2002, 95), as trust in or conviction of 
(fides, pistis) the truth of being. This “persevering in the utmost deciding” consists 
in a holding- oneself-in- the-truth- of-being without any hold:21 “Such holding 
firm and the stance it implies will be more genuinely successful the more 
21 Derrida’s argument that Heidegger presupposes faith, namely, the understanding of being 
(Seinsverständnis) (Derrida 2002, 94–95), has to be rejected therefore.
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originally they are determined by the stance, and the less exclusively they are defined 
purely by the hold they have on things; that is to say, they will be more genuinely 
successful if they are essentially able to revert back to themselves and not lean on 
things, not depend on them for support” (Heidegger 1986, 135; 1991, 124–25). This 
holding- oneself-in- the-truth of being concerns a specific Haltung or attitude that 
enacts a possible projection of the truth of being, a possible hold (Heidegger 1986, 
140; 1994b, 368–70).22 It is this projecting- opening attitude (Haltung) that holds onto 
its projection of the truth of being, holds onto the truth that discloses our 
questioning. Both ways of faith or belief as holding- oneself-in-the-truth of being 
essentially belong together in our philosophical questioning in the age of the 
abandonment of being. In the age of the abandonment of being, faith or belief is a 
necessary condition for the original stance of inquiry (Fragehaltung) of philosophy 
because the truth of being can only resonate in a philosophical questioning that is 
characterized by this holding-oneself-in-the-truth.
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